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ABSTRACT 
Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any 
limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms 
have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at 
cross-border level: (i) the “implicit auction”, already used in some countries, and (ii) the 
“coordinated explicit auction”, proposed by the European Transmission System Operators 
(ETSO) but not implemented yet. The main advantage of the explicit auction is that it allows 
each country to keep its own power exchange running. In the European institutional context, 
this is seen as a factor of success of a market reform, although the explicit auction (not 
coordinated) is known to be less efficient than the implicit mechanism. The addition of a 
coordination dimension in the explicit auction is intended to solve problems of international 
flows. We use an experimental methodology to identify and compare in a laboratory setting 
the efficiency properties of these two market mechanisms, given a market structure similar to 
the existing one in continental Europe, i.e. a competitive oligopoly. Our main result highlights 
the inefficiency of the coordinated explicit auction compared to the performance of the 
implicit auction, measured in terms of both energy prices and transmission capacity 
allocation. We suggest that the poor performance of the coordinated explicit auction in the 
laboratory is due to the level of individual expectations about both energy and transmission 
prices that the mechanism demands. One solution to resolve this problem when the 
mechanism is implemented in the field would be to design an additional and secondary 
market for “used” transmission capacity. 
Keywords: auctions; congestion management; electricity markets; experimental economics 
Mots clefs : enchère, gestion des congestions, marchés de l'électricité, économie expérimentale 
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Coordinating cross-border congestion management through auctions:   
An experimental approach to European solutions 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Electricity Market (IEM) targeted by the 1996 Directive 96/92/EC is 
currently still far from completion, for Europe is still fragmented into a number of regions, 
each with its own transactional arrangement and organized marketplace for wholesale electric 
power. However, the recent coupling and mergers of power exchanges – as for example the 
German EEX Power Spot and the French Powernext Day-Ahead within EPEX Spot in 2009, 
the trilateral coupling of the EPEX Day-Ahead with the Day-Ahead markets of the 
Netherlands and Belgium, or the Swiss-German Eurex and Slovenian Borzen in 2008 – 
together with the political pressures from the Commission (European  Commission, 2009) to 
organize the IEM, can be considered as efforts towards a more effective integration.  
The creation of the IEM depends heavily on efficient coordination between national 
markets. One condition to ensure efficient coordination is to make sure that, as far as possible, 
electricity flows between Member States as easily as it currently flows within them (European 
Commission, 2004). This requires sufficient interconnections and adequate and efficient 
cross-borders congestion management schemes. At present, the main obstacle to integration is 
precisely the scarcity of cross-border transmission capacity across Europe. This situation 
leads to cross-border congestions and their related externalities: uncertainty, risk and market 
power problems. To mitigate these problems, the EU supports measures to increase 
transmission capacity while at the same time looking for efficient cross-border congestion 
management methods. In this paper we focus on the second issue, and examine market design 
mechanisms proposed to improve the management of cross-border congestion.  
In the June 2003 regulation (EC) n°1228/2003 of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the “Conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity”, the Commission laid down preliminary guidelines for the implementation of 
cross-border congestion management methods. The guidelines stipulate that these 
management methods should include “non-discriminatory market-based solutions that give 
efficient economic signals” (European Commission, 2003). To conform to the European 
regulation, the administrative methods traditionally used in Europe and based on pro-rata or 
first-come-first-served rules – i.e. typically non-market-based methods – were progressively 
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replaced by market-based methods for day-ahead allocation in July 2004
1
. These are flow-
based zonal methods
2
 which can rely on two types of auction mechanism: the implicit auction 
and the explicit auction
3
.   
The first auction mechanism is called “implicit” as the available transmission capacities 
are implicitly taken into account by the market operator in the selection of energy offers. It is 
a pricing mechanism derived from the early work on nodal pricing by Bohn, Caramanis and 
Schweppe (1984) and Hogan (1992). The implicit auction is currently applied in Europe to 
allocate transmission capacity among the Nordic countries
4
 (known as the “market splitting” 
method
5
), in the trilateral coupling of the Netherlands, Belgium and France (TLC), in the 
MIBEL market covering the Iberian Peninsula, and within the Italian market which is splitted 
into several internal zones. It already reflects a certain degree of integration, and is 
particularly appropriate for day-ahead capacity rights, since the flow is based on the day-
ahead market data from two interconnected markets. However the main argument against this 
method in the European context is that the meshing of the continental grid makes market 
splitting, as well as other related methods, inapplicable without the merger of power 
exchanges, which is quite unrealistic from an institutional and political point of view. As 
Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) explain, the existing differences in the architecture of 
electricity markets in European neighbouring countries (including pool structure as well as 
bilateral markets now in place and the wide diversity of market rules) render integration 
currently difficult if not impossible. Hence, the existence of various system operators, each 
responsible for one control area, politically and institutionally constrains the generalization of 
the implementation of the implicit auction. Finally, it is worth noting that there are also 
technical obstacles, but these are beyond the scope of this paper. The only feasible and 
plausible solution in the short term is thus to link zonal markets, but that is not conducive to 
integration and the creation of the IEM. 
In the second auction mechanism, called the explicit auction mechanism, transmission 
capacities are auctioned separately and before the allocation of wholesale energy. Explicit 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of the current cross-border congestion management methods in Europe, cf. 
ETSO (2006). 
2
 Flow-based methods use the so-called power transfer distribution factors (PTDF) to convert the 
commercial exchanges into their physical influence on the cross-border flow. Another aspect of these methods, 
which cannot be considered within the scope of this paper, is that they convert bottlenecks or border capacities 
into physical limitations of those flows. 
3
 For a review of congestion management methods, see De Vries (2004). 
4
 Denmark (west and east), Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
5
 The market-splitting approach assumes an existing integrated market where injections and withdrawals 
of several nodes are assigned to a specific zone (so that there is only one energy price per zone). 
 4 
auctions are increasingly used among European countries (ETSO, 2006). They are 
particularly appropriate for the allocation of long-term capacity rights (sold at yearly or 
monthly auctions). In practical terms, they do not require a single power exchange as in the 
case of the implicit auction. However, as in California, it is up to the system operator to 
coordinate the physics of the problem after transmission and generation contracts have been 
signed ex ante by all the private scheduling coordinators. This coordination problem between 
system operators is typically not taken into account in the explicit auction mechanism, and 
therefore does not favour market integration. The so-called “explicit coordinated auction” 
mechanism has been proposed by European system operators precisely to offset this lack of 
coordination in the case of cross-border flows. 
 The spirit of the “coordinated explicit auction” mechanism was initially proposed by 
the Florence Regulatory Forum established in 1999. It was seen as a way to overcome 
political and institutional obstacles to coordination and integration of European markets. This 
mechanism was subsequently adopted by the European Transmission System Operators 
(ETSO) in 2001. In the ETSO’s proposal, the auction is coordinated, in the sense that, instead 
of having an auction for transmission capacity at each cross-border zone (with the various 
system operators in charge of coordinating the physics), the transmission capacities are all 
auctioned off in the same process (especially across zones characterized by strong loop 
flows). In other words, the available transmission capacities are all covered by a single 
auction. At the individual level, this centralized mechanism should limit uncertainties over the 
allocation and prices of transmission rights, and therefore reduce the risk of productive 
inefficiencies. At the aggregate level, a better coordination between zones should enable a 
better allocation of transmission capacity (and a better estimation of capacities that could be 
auctioned in a secure and reliable way). Overall, the aim of this proposal is to achieve the full 
potential of the existing European interconnected network, through an adequate cross-border 
congestion management scheme, while each area may keep its own rules to manage its 
internal problems. In a nutshell, this solution seems to be more “institutionally friendly”.! 
Since the ETSO’s proposal, the efficiency conditions of the implementation of the 
coordinated auction mechanism in Europe has been studied. However, it has not yet achieved 
political or scientific consensus, and discussions are still on-going regarding both its 
efficiency in managing cross-border congestions and its properties in terms of European 
market integration. For instance, the Third Legislative Package approved in April 2009 
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recommends use of the coordinated mechanism notably for long- and medium-term allocation 
(EU, 2009)
6
. Our contribution seeks to participate in the on-going debate on cross-border 
management solutions and to further investigate the efficiency of the coordinated auction 
mechanism.  
From a theoretical point of view, under the assumption of benevolent generators that 
truthfully reveal their marginal costs, it is demonstrated that both mechanisms – the 
coordinated explicit auction and the implicit auction – should lead to: (i) an efficient 
allocation of available transmission capacity, and (ii) an efficient production in which the 
least-cost generation units are successively required to produce, given the capacity constraints 
of the network. However, as Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2005) point out, this analysis is based on 
perfect and rational individual expectations, which is a strong behavioural hypothesis. 
Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) emphasize how the perfect anticipation assumption strongly 
constrains the model, while the aggregation of the network limits the results (to keep traders 
from investigating the intricacies of the electrical network).  
From an empirical point of view, the international experiences of a separation of the 
energy and transmission markets underlying coordinated auction have raised some doubts 
about its efficiency (Ehrenmann, Smeers 2005), while the coordinated explicit auction – as 
proposed by ETSO – has never been applied. Consequently, there is a lack of data to be able 
to assess its efficiency.  
In this article we use the experimental methodology to collect data enabling us to assess 
whether and how the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction mechanism succeed 
in efficiently allocating scarce transmission capacity, while reducing generators' ability to 
exercise market power. Part of our contribution is methodological: in the laboratory setting 
we recreate a reasonable level of complexity enabling us to analyze in depth the two market 
mechanisms currently used or under scrutiny in Europe. We construct an experimental 
environment, using smart computer-assisted markets with a three-node network and its 
consequential constraints like loop flows and congestions, including the stochastic nature of 
the loads on the lines, the associated need to respect the physical constraints in the network, 
and the location variability of transmission losses. Our experimental design reproduces an 
industry structure akin to the current one in Continental Europe: a competitive oligopoly 
                                                 
6
 For example, the next step has been the ETSO-EuroPex’s proposal (ETSO-EuroPex 2004) which is 
conceived as the merging of ETSO and the EuroPex proposals. The European Commission subsequently 
recommended use of the coordinated explicit auction for the allocation of long-term capacities (annually, 
monthly, weekly), and the implicit auction through flow-based market coupling for the allocation of day ahead 
and intra-day capacities. 
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where major players are emerging, each of which is relying on a geographical stronghold and 
is present both at the production and at the supply level. Actually, in Europe there are neither 
“pure” generators nor “pure” suppliers in the electricity industry.
7
 We reproduce these 
individual characteristics in our experimental design by endowing “generators/suppliers” with 
both supply and demand functions which implicitly define individual net positions in each 
market as net buyer or net seller.  
We examine the effects of the two auction mechanisms – the implicit auction and the 
coordinated auction – on the pattern of both energy prices and capacity prices, and on the 
transit volume. Our main result highlights the superiority of the implicit auction mechanism 
over the coordinated explicit auctions. The coordinated explicit auction is inefficient in terms 
of global efficiency, and in terms of allocation of transmission capacity. Energy prices are 
highly volatile in the coordinated auction treatment and the transmission capacities are 
inefficiently used.  
The paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we present the experimental design and 
procedure, i.e. the characteristics of the electric power network (nodes, transmission capacity 
and power flows), the characteristics of the market participants (portfolio of generation units, 
individual supply and demand functions, and localization in the network), and the market 
institutions (the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction). In Section 3, we 
present our results on the global efficiency of the two auction mechanisms, the patterns of 
market prices for transmission capacity and energy, and the management of congestions. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Our experimental design seeks to represent the main features of the continental 
european market, in a laboratory setting. In terms of market structure, the experiment 
reproduces the same magnitude of market shares of continental european generators, and their 
localization in the network, which together characterize potential market power. The network 
configuration reproduces the existence of capacity limitations, but we do not take the intra-
country situations into account (in particular, we do not consider internal congestions). We 
first present the electric power network, and then turn to the description of the two market 
mechanisms.  
                                                 
7
 This is also the case in the US where most electricity firms are utilities which are vertically integrated. 
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2.1. The network  
The network is modelled in the experiments as a three-node network with loop flows. In 
our model, a node refers to a country. The three nodes are called A, B and C. The 
transmission lines between nodes are defined by: (i) their maximum capacities – 50 units of 
energy between A and B, 30 between A and C, and 30 between B and C –; and (ii) the power 
flows in the network, given the Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF) matrix. These 
PTDF give the flows through the lines A-B, A-C and C-B respectively, resulting from 
injections at all nodes of the network and withdrawals at node C (taken here as the “hub”). 
Figure 1 represents our experimental network. 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Three-node experimental network with loop flow effects (injection at node A and withdrawal at node C).  
 
 
Table 1 - PTDF matrix for a withdrawal 
of one unit of energy at node C.  
 
 
 Interconnection 
Node of injection 
 
A!B A!C B!C 
A +1/3 +2/3 +1/3 
B -1/3 +1/3 +2/3 
Maximum capacity 50 30 30 
 
The market structure in the experiments consists of 4 generators (G1 through G4 in 
Figure 1), unevenly located in the network. Generator G1 is dominant at node A, while 
generator G4 is dominant at node C, and generators G2 and G3 are together dominant at node 
B. At each node, a generator is endowed with an individual supply function and an individual 
demand function. These demand and supply functions are designed in order to model 
individual willingness to buy or to sell energy in the three different markets. The inverse 
demand function gives the limit price under which a generator is willing to buy energy. 
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Symmetrically, the inverse supply function gives the limit price above which the generator is 
willing to sell energy. Limit prices reflect the opportunity cost for using production facilities 
and the commitment to a must-serve demand. For instance, a generator with a must-serve 
demand constraint is a potential buyer in the market at any price below its own production 
cost. Symmetrically, a generator with an excess of production capacity is a potential seller at 
any price above its production cost. Demand and supply functions are reproduced in the 
experiment according to the redemption-value theory principle (Smith, 1976). Accordingly, a 
generator in the laboratory is informed about the value (redemption value) it receives for each 
unit it buys and the value (marginal cost) it supports for each unit it sells. Table 2 reproduces 
as an example the redemption values and marginal costs of Generator 1 at node B. 
 
Table 2 - Individual demand and supply of Generator 1 at node B for base load period (values are given in ECU, 
an experimental currency) 
Individual supply function  Individual demand function 
Marginal Cost (MC)  Redemption value (RV) 
From unit: … To unit …. UC  From unit: … To unit …. RV 
0 30 80  0 70 79 
31 80 130  71 170 0 
81 180 200     
 
 
The market demand and supply for energy at each node is the aggregation of individual 
demand and supply functions. The market demand is cyclic, from both an individual and an 
aggregate point of view with two levels, namely the peak-load and base-load levels
8
. 
Aggregate demand and supply at each node for, respectively, peak-load and base-load levels 
are described in Figures 2 and 3.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 This specification aims at reproducing in a simple way two characteristics of electricity demand: variability 
and cyclic variation. It is a simplification of the typical daily load curve that exists in reality with two higher-
level periods (between 7.00 and 9.00a.m. and 5.00 and 7.00p.m.) and two lower-level periods (between 3.00 and 
6.00a.m. and 9.00 and 12.00a.m.). 
 9 
 
Fig. 2 - Supply and demand curves for base-load periods at each node 
 
 
Fig. 3 - Supply and demand curves for peak-load periods at each node 
 
The optimal flows in the network and the competitive equilibrium market prices in these 
two situations are described in Figure 4 below. These equilibrium prices are computed under 
the assumption that at each node each generator submits its limit prices to buy and sell.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4 - Optimal flows and competitive equilibrium prices for base-load (left) and peak-load (right) periods 
 
 10 
For base-load and peak-load periods, we compute the maximum global surplus by 
summing the four generators’ profits plus the congestion rent at the equilibrium. The value of 
the maximum global surplus is 5,170 ECU for base-load periods and 2,830 for peak-load 
periods
9
.   
Finally, the information released to all participants during the course of the experiment 
concerns the basic characteristics of the network, that is, the PTDF-matrix and the maximum 
capacity of each line (both held constant across sessions), the market prices at each node, as 
well as the flows on each line as an historical informational feedback. 
2.2. The market institutions  
In the following subsections we present the two alternative market institutions, 
namely, the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction, as we modelled them in the 
lab. The central feature of the auctions that we want to test is the sequence of events: 
simultaneity of allocation of transmission capacity and energy in the implicit auction versus 
the sequential allocation of transmission capacity and energy in the explicit auction. We 
provide rationale in the section for the structures of energy markets and identify which 
features of the market are going to be tested. 
2.2.1. The implicit auction  
The implicit auction consists in simultaneously allocating transmission and energy 
capacities, in respectively a centralized and a decentralized way. Figure 5 represents the 
sequence of events and the information structure for the implicit auction.  
Participants may submit offers to either sell or buy units of electricity. Each offer is 
made for a dedicated node, and is composed of a unit price/quantity pair. We use an 
optimization algorithm to determine the set of offers that maximizes the total surplus, and that 
is compatible with two constraints: (i) the aggregate supply must equal the aggregate demand 
of the whole system, and (ii) the transmission constraints (capacities, flows and loop-flows) 
have to be respected
10
. 
                                                 
9
 These values are used as a reference to assess the efficiency of the allocation obtained during the 
experiment. If the computed global surplus equals these values, this corresponds to an efficiency rate of 100%. 
10
 The bidding process and the optimization algorithm are detailed in Appendix 1. 
 11 
 
Fig. 5 - Sequence of events in the implicit auction 
 
If no congestion occurs, then the selection process simply follows the merit order: offers 
are selected according to the increasing order of unit prices to equalize the market supply and 
demand. In this case, the energy prices at the three nodes are equal. If congestion occurs, then 
the merit order is corrected according to the network constraint and the localization of offers. 
In practice, this implies that some offers that would have been retained without any 
congestion are finally not accepted; while others that were too high to be retained at first 
glance will finally be accepted. Energy prices at each node are obtained using the shadow 
prices computed from the Lagrangian maximization program. The bidding constraints 
associated with the congested transmission line give the price of the congestion. The marginal 
price of electricity at each node is then inferred from this price through the PTDF-matrix
11
. 
Each generator receives private information concerning the acceptance rate of each of 
its offers, along with public information about the price at each node and the flows on each 
line. The profits of a generator for a period equal the sum of the profits it is making at each 
node. At a given node, its profits correspond to the sum of the redemption values of the units 
it owns and the revenue from the units it has sold. 
2.2.2. The coordinated explicit auction 
One of the main features of the coordinated explicit auction is that it affords any 
generator in a given power network the opportunity to buy and sell energy at each node of the 
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 The calculation of the energy prices from the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian of the 
maximization program is detailed in Appendix 1. 
Generators submit at each zone: 
 offers to sell and buy energy 
Multi-zone merit order under 
network constraints:  
Uniform-price sealed-bid auction 
Generators obtain market information:  
Energy offers accepted, prices and flows 
Time 
Generators derive 
profits 
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network, even if it is (or not) physically producing energy at that node. Since the auction for 
transmission capacity and energy are clearly separated, the only condition for a generator who 
wishes to sell at a node where it is not present, is to have bought the corresponding 
transmission capacity to transport energy to this node prior to the energy auction. Figure 6 
represents the sequence of events in the coordinated explicit auction, as modelled in the 
experiment.  
 
 
Fig. 6 - Sequence of events in the coordinated explicit auction 
 
The coordinated explicit auction is a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, a uniform-
price auction is organized for the allocation of the sole transmission capacity between nodes 
in the network. In the second stage, an energy market opens at each node. These energy 
markets at each node work independently of one another, using a uniform-price mechanism to 
equilibrate the corresponding nodal market supply and demand. In other words, this second 
stage works as a procurement auction, run to allocate the right to inject energy into or 
withdraw it from the network.  
A crucial characteristic of the coordinated explicit auction considered in the ETSO 
proposal is the “must use” attribute of the capacity allocated to a generator. In the capacity 
allocation stage, generators bid for “obligations” rather than “options” to use transmission 
capacity. Obligations are needed to allocate the maximum transmission capacity of a line 
Generators submit 
offers for 
transmission 
capacities 
 
Multi-line maximization of the profits from the 
auction under transmission constraints:  
Line by line uniform-price sealed-bid auction 
Generators get market information:  
Transmission obligations, line 
prices and flows 
Time 
Generators 
get profits 
Independent Merit order for offers in each 
zone:  
Three uniform-price sealed-bid auctions 
Generators submit offers 
to sell and buy energy 
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since they enable an operator to net the electricity flows running in opposite directions
12
. In 
practice, in the experiment, through individual demand and supply functions, generators are 
individually penalized if the flows that they have generated do not correspond to the 
transmission capacity that they acquired in the first stage, i.e. if they use more or fewer 
capacity than they previously bought
13
.  A generator which fails to use the transmission 
capacity allocated to it for the period is penalized through high production costs at the node 
where it should have had injected energy, and a zero redemption value at the node where it 
should have withdrawn energy. This acts as a penalty high enough to discourage such a 
behaviour. 
Stage I: Auction for transmission capacity 
The first stage of the coordinated explicit auction is the allocation of the existing 
transmission capacity.  The participants bid to buy only transmission capacity that are sold by 
a factitious central auction house on the basis of the information given by the transmission 
system operators. At this stage, each participant is allowed to submit bids to buy a right to use 
transmission capacity from one node to another node for one period. The proposal is thus 
defined by the injection node, the withdrawal node, the amount of energy units transmitted, 
and the per-transmission-capacity unit price. The bidders identify the line as well as the 
direction of the flow.  
The auction for transmission capacity ends before the starting of the auction for energy. 
Consequently, the bids for transmission capacity depend on the market participants’ 
anticipations of energy market prices. 
To allocate transmission capacity, a uniform-price sealed-bid auction is used. Given the 
received bids, and taking into account the network constraints, the central auctioneer 
determines which bids will be accepted and the price paid for them. The selection of the bids 
and the determination of the equilibrium price result from the maximization of the profits 
from the auction under the transmission constraints. The transmission capacity should be 
                                                 
12
 The netting of the flows is automatically taken into account in the implicit auction through the 
optimization program and the PTDF. Since in the explicit auctions the market participants bid for transmission 
capacities for one zone to another, we have to assume that they bid for obligations so that they can use the same 
amount of capacity as with the implicit auction. Otherwise the implicit auction would de facto be more efficient 
than the explicit one. 
13
 For example, a generator who has bought capacities to transport units from zone A to zone C has to 
inject – to produce or to buy – the adequate quantity in zone A at any cost, and to withdraw – to sell or use – the 
same amount in zone C even if it yields zero revenue. At the extreme, to respect transmission commitment, the 
generator who failed to buy the adequate quantity at the exportation zone could suffer important production costs 
with no revenue in return. 
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allocated to those who value them the most, under the constraint that the amount allocated at 
the end of the process should not exceed the maximum capacity of each line (taking into 
account both the flows and counter flows). Given that the transmission rights are directional, 
each line is characterized by a double capacity limit constraint. We use an optimization 
algorithm to determine the set of bids that are finally accepted
14
. If there is no congestion, all 
bids are accepted. If one or more congestions occur, some bids have to be partly accepted and 
even rejected.  
At the end of the auction process, each generator receives private information 
concerning the acceptance rate of each of its bids, and public information on the price and the 
flows of each directional transmission line, and on the congestions. Prices for transmission 
rights are obtained using the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian maximization 
program. The bidding constraints associated with the congested transmission lines give the 
price of the congestion. The marginal price of transmission rights for each line is calculated 
by multiplying the shadow prices by the PTDF factor
15
. In general, to accept or reject part of a 
bid, the software calculates the price at which each generator agrees to pay for using the 
congested line. It then gives priority to those bids that value the congested line most. It orders 
bids by increasing prices, which have been normalized by the Power Transmission 
Distribution Factors (PTDF) of the concerned injection node and for the requested 
transmission line. The software accepts bids until all the transmission capacities are exhausted 
(after checking that it does not create any additional congestion). The price that each 
generator has to pay equals the last bid accepted by the auctioneer, weighted by the PTDF of 
each of its bids on the constrained line. At the end, a generator pays a price for transmission 
that corresponds to its contribution to the congestion, related to the flow that it wants. If the 
flow contributes to relieving the congestion, the price the generator has to pay is negative i.e. 
it is paid for its transmission. If the allocation implies no congestion, no generator is charged 
for the capacity allocated. 
Stage II: Auction for energy 
The second stage consists of three independent and simultaneous energy markets, one 
for each node. Generators are allowed to participate in the three auctions simultaneously. 
However, they expose themselves to considerable costs if they do not own the corresponding 
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 The bidding process and the optimization program are set out in Appendix 2. 
15
 The calculation of prices for transmission right from the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian 
of the maximization program is detailed in Appendix 2. 
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transmission capacity for the unit that they are selling in any market where they are not 
present. This design features aims at capturing the “must-use” rule. 
The three energy auctions are uniform-price sealed-bid auctions, where the offers (either 
to sell or to buy) are composed of a price/quantity of energy pair. The allocation of energy 
through each auction results from the maximization of the total surplus. It therefore follows a 
simple merit order (the offers are selected according to the increasing order of prices to meet 
the must-serve demand of the node considered). 
At the end of the three energy auctions, generators receive the information concerning 
the acceptation rate of each of their offers, and public information is given on the market 
prices at each node.  
The profits of a generator for a period are composed of three elements: (i) the sum of 
the gains
16
 and losses from the use of transmission capacity, (ii) plus the sum of the profits 
and losses from market exchanges on the three energy marketplaces, (iii) plus the sum of the 
redemption values of the units consumed minus the marginal cost of the units produced at 
each node, subject to the final individual injections and withdrawals resulting from the 
transmission commitments and the energy market transactions. 
3. RESULTS 
The experiments were run in the experimental laboratories of the GATE (Lyon) and of 
the GAEL (Grenoble), using a dedicated market software developed with the experimental 
software Regate, the Internet-Based Software for Experimental Economics of the GATE 
(Zeiliger 2000). Undergraduate students were recruited from a business school, an 
engineering school and economic departments of the universities of the two locations.  
Given the relative complexity of the experimental design, we organized each 
experimental session over two days, lasting two and a half hours on each day. The first day, 
students were taught the rules and trained with the instructions. The second day, they 
participated in the experimental session itself, taking the results into account for the payment. 
The data and results reported below were collected from these second-day sessions.  
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 Gains result from the fact that a generator can be paid for transmission if the flows that it requests 
relieve congestion. 
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In the lab, the duration of one period of an implicit session is shorter than one period of 
an explicit session
17
. This explains why the number of periods per session collected for the 
explicit treatment in our early experiments was lower than for the implicit treatment. In order 
to control for this difference, we conducted four additional explicit treatment sessions with 
extended sessions lasting at least 20 periods. Finally, we ran sixteen sessions in total, using 
the two market mechanisms as treatment variables. We have six independent findings for the 
implicit mechanism and ten for the explicit mechanism (see Table 3). Subjects were paid a 
!20 fixed payment for the “learning session” and, on average, !26 for the "data session". 
 
Table 3 - Summary of experiments 
Session Date Treatment Number of periods 
Implicit-S1 25&26 May 2005 Implicit 26 
Implicit-S2 25&26 May 2005 Implicit 26 
Implicit-S3 25&26 May 2005 Implicit 24 
Implicit-S4 8&9 June 2005 Implicit 30 
Implicit-S5 8&9 June 2005 Implicit 30 
Implicit-S6 8&9 June 2005 Implicit 30 
Explicit-S1 6&7 June 2005 Explicit 14 
Explicit-S2 6&7 June 2005 Explicit 15 
Explicit-S3 6&7 June 2005 Explicit 14 
Explicit-S4 15&16 June 2005 Explicit 15 
Explicit-S5 15&16 June 2005 Explicit 17 
Explicit-S6 15&16 June 2005 Explicit 17 
Explicit-S7 12 November 2009 Explicit 19 
Explicit-S8 12 November 2009 Explicit 24 
Explicit-S9 12 November 2009 Explicit 25 
Explicit-S10 12 November 2009 Explicit 26 
 
 
We report our results as a series of five findings, one related to the global efficiency of 
the system (i.e. the evaluation of the global surplus) and four concerning the economic 
performance of each auction design in terms of energy prices and flows.  
3.1. Global efficiency  
The efficiency is equal to the ratio of the observed global surplus and the theoretical 
maximum global surplus. For the implicit treatment, we calculated the global surplus by 
summing the four generators’ profits plus the congestion rents in the implicit treatment. In the 
explicit treatment, the global surplus is the sum of the four generators’ profits plus revenues 
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 A period of coordinated explicit auction with a sequence of two interdependent auctions takes more 
time than a period of implicit auction with a single auction. 
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obtained from the sale of transmission rights. We observe extensive individual losses during 
some periods conducted under the explicit treatment. In order not to sidestep the analysis in 
favour of the implicit treatment, we decided to reduce negative efficiency rates to zero. 
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the average global efficiency, and the minimum and maximum 
levels observed by treatment.  
We present the results in two graphs: the first one is based on the sessions lasting 14 
periods, while the second one is based on the sessions lasting at least 24 periods
18
.   
 
 
Fig. 7 - Average global efficiency (14 periods) 
 
 
Fig. 8 - Average global efficiency (sessions over 24 periods only) 
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 Although all sessions lasted for at least 14 periods, only 9 lasted for 24 periods. These longer sessions 
represent a reduced sub-sample of our observations and should therefore be treated apart.  
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The implicit auction appears as the most efficient mechanism (Fig. 7). For the sessions 
conducted under the implicit treatment, efficiency increases rapidly and remains close to the 
90% level. Overall, we observe only 5 periods, out of the 166 periods collected, which have a 
zero or negative efficiency rate whereas for 38 periods the efficiency rate is over 95%. In the 
sessions of the explicit treatment, the observed efficiency rate is significantly lower and 
erratic (especially for the session lasting over 24 periods). Negative global surplus and zero 
efficiency are even observed in 25 of the 187 periods collected. The mean efficiency rate for 
the coordinated explicit auction treatment over all the periods is 50% whereas the figure 
obtained for the implicit auction treatment is 81%. 
 
Finding 1: The implicit auction is more efficient than the coordinated explicit auction.  
Evidence: In all sessions and all periods taken together, the mean global efficiency for 
the implicit treatment is 81% against 50% for the explicit treatment.   
• In the implicit auction treatment, the global surplus increases with the number 
of periods, which suggests that generators are learning how to be more 
efficient. Furthermore, the efficiency is higher for peak periods. 
• In the coordinated explicit treatment the evolution of the efficiency rate is 
erratic and it is not possible to conclude on any learning effect, even when 
taking into account the session with up to 24 periods.  
We use the following linear panel data model as the basis for a quantitative support to 
Finding 1. The model explains the efficiency of a session as a function notably of the level of 
demand and the dynamic convergence toward 100% efficiency. The sixteen independent 
sessions are modelled as random effects .  
! 
Effit = "0 + "1Dit
DH
+ "
2
Dit
Exp
+ "
3
t
2
+# it  
where 
! 
Effit   denotes the efficiency of session i at period t, 
! 
D
it
DH  a dummy variable 
which takes the value one for high-level demand periods and zero otherwise, 
! 
Dit
Exp  a 
dummy variable which takes the value one for periods under the explicit treatment and 
zero otherwise. 
! 
t
2 , the square of period, fits the dynamics of the convergence to 100% 
efficiency observed in the data
19
.  
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 By definition, the efficiency indicator is limited at the 100% level. Nevertheless, we observe no specific 
concentration in the distribution of our data and decided not to use a model for limited dependant and qualitative 
variables. 
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Table 4 - Estimates of the linear model for efficiency (using between-effect specification) 
 
Table 4 reports the estimateS of the linear model for efficiency. The coordinated explicit 
treatment significantly contributes to reducing the efficiency. The loss of efficiency is 
estimated at 32%. The efficiency observed in peak-load periods is significantly greater than 
that observed in base-load periods (10.6%). Efficiency increases significantly as the periods 
are repeated. This could be interpreted as a learning dynamic. Learning is nevertheless 
minimal compared to the efficiency gap between coordinated explicit and implicit auction. 
Even in this experimental environment favourable to learning (at least 24 periods), it could 
take very long before explicit auctions become as efficient as implicit auctions. Note that the 
experimental environment is particularly favourable for learning as all variables are stable 
from one period to another. We can anticipate that observations under a more unstable 
environment would reinforce our conclusion about the superiority of the implicit treatment for 
efficiency.   
These differences in efficiency between the two treatments can be explained by the joint 
effect of two factors: the evolution and convergence of energy prices (3.2) and the flows 
between nodes (3.3). We will now analyze these two effects separately. 
3.2. Energy prices  
The market prices observed at each node are compared to the competitive equilibrium 
(CE) price computed when assuming that each generator offers energy at a price equal to its 
marginal value with the implicit treatment. Average distance from CE prices and standard 
deviations by period and by treatment are represented in Figures 9, 10 for node A, 11 and 12 
for node B and 13 and 14 for node C, for the 14 firsts periods with all the sessions.  
 
! 
Effit = "0 + "1Dit
DH
+ "
2
Dit
Exp
+ "
3
tit
2
+# it  
 Coef Std. Err. z P > | z | 
 0. 6632 0. 0485 13.67 0.001 
 0.1066 0. 0317 3.37 0.000 
 -0.32 0. 0582 -5.49 0.000 
 0.0003 0. 0001 5.55 0.000 
353 Obs 
Rsquare overall = 0.3401 
! between-i = 0.0969 
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Fig. 9 – Node A for implicit treatment 
  
Fig. 10 – Node A for explicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 11 – Node B for implicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 12 – Node B for explicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 13 – Node C for implicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 14 – Node C for explicit treatment 
Fig. 13-14 – Average distance from competitive equilibrium price and standard deviation (in ECU). 
 
The differences between treatments are unambiguous. The dispersion of energy prices 
and the volatility of prices from period to period rapidly decrease in the implicit auction 
sessions: there is a strong convergence toward a single, specific price at each node. We find 
higher price dispersion between sessions with the coordinated explicit auction and higher 
volatility from period to period in each session.  
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Finding 2: Energy prices observed in the implicit auction sessions converge 
towards a single equilibrium price. 
To assess quantitatively the evolution and convergence of market prices, we use a 
convergence model inspired by Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995) for data collected with 
the implicit auction treatment
20
.  
! 
pit = Di
i
" #1i 1/ t( ) + #2(t $1) / t +% it  
where  is the average price of session i for period t and  a dummy variable which 
takes the value one for session i and zero otherwise. This model is relevant to estimate the 
convergence process which could occur in a market experiment. Even if each session has its 
own starting point, they should converge – if a convergence occurs – to the same ultimate 
point. The model is estimated as a linear panel data model and the six independent sessions 
are modelled as random effects . We estimate the model for the price of each node, 
distinguishing between base-load and peak-load periods. As the prices observed at the 
beginning of each session are not really relevant to our analysis, we focus our presentation on 
price convergence
21
. Table 5 reports the estimates for  for each node and for base-load and 
peak-load periods.  
Table 5 Estimates price convergence model (using maximum-likelihood specification) 
 
 
Node A 
 Coef Std. Err. z P > | z | [95% Conf. Inteval] 
Load  period (Comp. Price: 50) 59.724 2.0022 29.83 0.000 55.800 63.648 
Peak-load period (Comp. Price: 93) 90.136 0.7083 127.25 0.000 88.747 91.524 
 
Node B 
 Coef Std. Err. z P > | z | [95% Conf. Inteval] 
Load  period (Comp. Price: 79) 80.375 0.7871 102.11 0.000 78.833 81.918 
Peak-load period (Comp. Price: 109) 107.382 0.5358 200.4 0.000 106.332 108.432 
 
Node C 
 Coef Std. Err. z P > | z | [95% Conf. Inteval] 
Load  period (Comp. Price: 108) 102.173 1.1296 90.45 0.000 99.959 104.387 
Peak-load period (Comp. Price: 125) 125.861 1.5485 81.28 0.000 122.826 128.896 
 
                                                 
20
 The price dynamics for the coordinated explicit auction treatments do not fit the assumption of this 
model. As a result, we cannot conduct the same analysis for the data collected in this treatment. 
21
 The complete results of the estimation are available upon request. 
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Energy prices observed with the implicit treatment converge towards a single 
equilibrium price for each node and for each demand level. The estimated prices of 
convergence are statistically significant and have a small standard deviation. The price of 
convergence for node A and base-load periods equals 59.7 and is significantly higher than the 
competitive market price of 50. Likewise, the price of convergence for node C and base-load 
periods equals 102.1, that is, less than the competitive market price of 108. These 
observations suggest the use of market power from generator G1 at node A and generator G4 
at node C. Apart from these two situations, the observed market prices converge to the 
competitive market price.  
 
 Finding 3: Energy prices in the coordinated explicit auction sessions fail to 
converge to a single equilibrium price.  
The coordinated explicit auction does not induce price stability in the system. Figures 
10, 12 and 14 show price dispersions between sessions. These price dispersions are 
significant. For instance, for the 14
th
 period, we observe a standard deviation of 90 ECU at 
node A, 126 ECU at node B and 28 ECU at node C. These dispersions between sessions do 
not disappear with period repetitions. The volatility of energy prices has a direct consequence 
on the efficiency of the auction for transmission capacity. An accurate valuation of these 
capacities requires stable energy prices at each node of the network. Without this stability 
generators cannot correctly assess the inter-node market price differences, and therefore can 
hardly bid appropriately during the transmission auction. As a consequence, the energy price 
instability leads to a misallocation of transmission capacity.  
3.3. Flows, congestions and transmission prices 
Given the market structure at each node and maximum capacities for each line, line AC 
appears as the critical resource in the search for the optimal energy allocation through the 
three-node network. We can therefore expect permanent congestion on this line with an 
efficient allocation of transmission capacity. Rates of congestion reported in Tables 6 and 7 
show a significant difference in the allocation of transmission capacity between sessions with 
implicit auction and with coordinated explicit auction.  
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Base-load period Peak-load period 
Line AB AC BC AB AC BC 
Obs. 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Mean flow 22 30 8 11 29 19 
Congestion 
observed 
17 81 24 0 81 30 
Table 6 - Congestion with implicit treatment 
Rate of 
congestion 
21% 98% 29% 0% 98% 36% 
 
 
Base-load period Peak-load period 
Line AB AC BC AB AC BC 
Obs. 98 98 98 89 89 89 
Mean flow 11 27 17 4 29 25 
Congestion 
observed 
5 74 43 1 84 50 
Table 7 - Congestion with explicit treatment 
Rate of 
congestion 
5% 76% 44% 1% 94% 56% 
 
Finding 4. The implicit auction leads to a better allocation of transmission capacity in 
the network, compared to the coordinated explicit auction, which leads to an under-use 
of the transmission capacity. 
We observe that transmission lines are saturated with both mechanisms especially 
during peak-load periods when the demand on the network is greater. During base-load 
periods, for the critical line AC, congestion is observed in almost every period in the implicit 
treatment. In the explicit treatment, congestion rate of line AC is above 75%. The capacity of 
line AC is thus not fully allocated for one period out of four. These results show that, under 
explicit treatment, there is an under-use of the network, with inadequate flows and at least 
efficiency waste. 
 
Finding 5. Transmission prices exhibit high dispersion throughout the repetition of 
periods in the coordinated explicit auction sessions  
The price dispersion between and within sessions is such that a structured analysis of 
the price convergence cannot be used. We thus restrict our study to a descriptive analysis. 
Table 8 reports price levels and dispersions in high-demand and low-demand periods.  
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Table 8 - Price of transmission capacity in the coordinated explicit session  
Base-load period (98 obs.) A!B A!C B!C 
Competitive equilibrium price for transmission capacity22 29 58 29 
Mean price 7.57 19.33 11.73 
Standard deviation 10.10 15.29 8.88 
Maximum price 26 52 60 
Minimum price -30 0 0 
    
Peak-load period (98 obs.) Peak-load 
period 
(98obs.) 
Peak-load 
period 
(98obs.) 
Peak-load 
period 
(98obs.) 
Competitive equilibrium price for transmission capacity 16 32 16 
Mean price 7.62 18.80 11.19 
Standard deviation 7.03 11.76 6.70 
Maximum price 21 42 35 
Minimum price -18 0 0 
  
We find that prices are lower than competitive equilibrium prices for transmission 
capacity at each node and for both base-load and peak-load periods. This result is a direct 
consequence of an under-use of the transmission capacity, for the price of transmission 
capacity is reduced to zero in periods without congestion. The standard deviations as the 
maximum and minimum values indicate that the prices are spread over a wide range of 
values. These prices are highly volatile and this volatility does not decrease with period 
repetition.  
4. CONCLUSION 
Using the experimental methodology in the laboratory setting, we tested and compared 
the efficiency of two alternative cross-border congestion management methods for electricity 
networks. Compared to the implicit mechanism, the coordinated explicit auction reveals its 
relative inefficiency in the laboratory, with mispricing and misallocation through the sequence 
of auctions. This is due to the necessary “must use it” rule: once bought, the transmission 
capacities have to be used otherwise there is a high penalty. Given this rule, a generator could 
have the incentive to sell energy at a very low price or to buy energy at a very high price to be 
able to meet its commitment. Price volatility on energy markets is an immediate consequence 
of the "must use rule" that makes it difficult for generators to accurately assess the inter-node 
market price differences, and therefore to bid efficiently during the transmission auction. It 
                                                 
22
 The competitive equilibrium price for transmission capacities is computed under the assumption that 
allocation of transmission capacities is efficient and that prices on the energy market at each node are equivalent 
to the competitive equilibrium price.  
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can consequently destabilize cross-border flows compared to the optimum flows and in return, 
destabilize the energy markets. 
Our results provide evidence that the implicit auction is more efficient than the 
coordinated explicit auction for the allocation of both transmission capacity and energy. They 
contribute to the current discussions on cross-border congestion methods. They show that 
even in a simple environment such as the one we created in the laboratory, subjects are not 
able to correctly anticipate what will happen in the energy markets with the coordinated 
explicit auction, and therefore do not individually take the right decisions in the capacity 
market.  
One explanation for this difference is the level of individual expectations that a subject 
needs in the experiment. In the coordinated explicit auction, individuals have to form 
expectations about both the transmission prices and the three energy market prices. The 
transmission prices depend on individual expectations about future energy prices, and in a 
repeated environment the energy prices in turn affect expectations about future individual 
decisions on transmission capacity. Overall, in the laboratory setting, the experiment reveals 
that even in longer sessions, individuals are constantly learning throughout the repetition of 
periods, collectively experiencing a “trial and error process” regarding their expectations of 
others’ behaviors. The laboratory experiments suggest that the learning process is long and 
demanding at the individual level. Complementary results using simulation models on a much 
longer timeline should help to shed light on the timing of the learning process. Our findings 
furthermore suggest the need to design and add rules to accelerate the learning process and 
thereby improve the efficiency of the coordinated explicit auction. We suggest that the 
addition of a secondary market on transmission capacity would operate as a way to price and 
value individual and collective over-investment or under-investment in transmission capacity. 
Another suggestion would be to add the possibilities to sell or to buy back transmission 
capacity to/from the system operator, adding a price corridor for transmission capacity to buy 
or to sell in order to give generators the financial incentives to do so.  
 
The introduction of the coordinated explicit auction however still raises many practical 
and institutional issues in Europe. Together with efficiency issues, they seem to have 
condemned the coordinated explicit auction for the IEM. Recent propositions are oriented 
more towards the implementation of a hybrid implicit/explicit auction (Frontier Economics 
Limited Consentec, 2004) or towards the use of the implicit auction in its open-market 
coupling version, as applied between Belgium, France and the Netherlands.  
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 Finally, the economic systems-design experiments presented in this paper raise a 
general methodological question. As we use the lab to test-bed market mechanisms, trying to 
integrate a certain level of parallelism with reality (meaning a level of complexity in the 
electric power case) in order to inform the liberalization process, we rely on experienced 
students to learn and perform individual decisions. Markets are used as an “impersonal 
exchange” system (Smith, 2003) to render these decisions as fundamental as we need them to 
be. The limitations of the experiments lie in two opposite directions: reducing the level of 
complexity would render the experiments simpler but lower the informative value of the 
results, given the specificity of the mechanism studied. On the other hand, increasing the level 
of complexity seems inappropriate in the laboratory setting, and rather calls for 
complementary methods, like agent-based modelling that would improve generalised 
laboratory results.  
 
We would like to thank Romain Zelinger (GATE) for the development of the software for the 
experiments.  
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 APPENDIX 1: BIDDING PROCESS AND OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM WITH 
IMPLICIT AUCTIONS 
For each period, each generator has the opportunity to submit a set of offers to sell and 
bids to buy. An offer to sell is a price-quantity ordered pair such that 
! 
piX
S
,SiX( ) is an offer to 
sell of one generator at node X, where 
! 
piX
S  is the unit price at which the generator agrees to 
sell and 
! 
S
iX
 the quantity he proposes to sell. Symmetrically, 
! 
p jX
D
,DjX( ) is an offer to buy of 
one generator at node X where 
! 
p jX
D  is the unit price at which the generator agrees to buy and 
! 
DjX  the quantity he proposes to buy. For all offers, the submitted quantities have to be 
positive (
! 
DjX > 0and 
! 
S
iX
> 0 ) as do the submitted prices 
! 
piX
S
> 0 and 
! 
p jX
D
> 0 .  
The outcome of the allocation process is 
! 
s
iX
 and 
! 
d jX , respectively the allocated quantity 
corresponding to the submitted offers to sell 
! 
piX
S
,SiX( ) and bids to buy 
! 
p jX
D
,DjX( ), and 
! 
ˆ p X  the 
market price for energy at node X (energy prices are shadow prices computed from the 
Lagrangian of the maximization program). 
Allocations and prices are determined according to the following optimization process. 
Constraint (1) indicates that offers can be either accepted or refused, partly or entirely. 
Constraint (2) indicates that the total supply has to equal the total demand. Constraints (3) 
correspond to transmission constraints on each line, in both senses of the flows. Therefore 
there are two constraints for each line.  
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! 
Max
d jX , siX
p jX
D
d jX " piX
S
siX
i
#
j
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) 
X  * A ,B ,C{ }
#
+ 
, 
- 
- 
. 
/ 
0 
0 
s.t.
1( )         d jX 1 DjX d jX 2 0
siX 1 SiX siX 2 0
3X * A,B,C{ } and for all the offers at node X
2( ) d jX
j
#
X  * A ,B ,C{ }
# " siX
i
#
X  * A ,B ,C{ }
# = 0
(3) siA
i
# " d jA
j
#
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% 
& & 
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( 
) ) *
1
3
+ siB
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j
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3
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) 1 50
siA
i
# " d jA
j
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
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) ) *
2
3
+ siB
i
# " d jB
j
#
$ 
% 
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' 
( 
) ) *
1
3
1 30
siA
i
# " d jA
j
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) *
1
3
+ siB
i
# " d jB
j
#
$ 
% 
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' 
( 
) ) *
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3
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siA
i
# " d jA
j
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3
+ siB
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j
#
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% 
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1
3
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' 
( 
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siA
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j
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' 
( 
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2
3
+ siB
i
# " d jB
j
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) *
1
3
2 "30
siA
i
# " d jA
j
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) *
1
3
+ siB
i
# " d jB
j
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) *
2
3
2 "30
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
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6 
6 
6 
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Prices are the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian maximization program:  
! 
L(s,d,µ) = p jX
D
d jX " piX
S
siX
i
#
j
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) 
X  * A ,B ,C{ }
# + µe d jX
j
#
X  * A ,B ,C{ }
# " siX
i
#
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) 
+ µXY (F
XY " FMAX
XY
)
X =A ,B ,C
Y =A ,B ,C
X +Y
#
 
with s, the set of allocated quantity to sell 
d, the set of allocated quantity to buy 
! 
µ , the set of Lagrange multipliers 
! 
F
XY
, the flow on line (X,Y) 
! 
F 
XY
, the maximum capacity on line (X,Y) 
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, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the system equilibrium constraint and 
! 
µ
XY
, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the transmission constraints on line (X,Y).  
 
Once the Lagrangian is optimized, we can compute the value of  and
! 
µ
XY
. The 
multiplier  corresponds to the marginal price for electricity (it corresponds to the marginal 
price of electricity at the swing node or at any bus if there are no network constraints). The 
Lagrangian multiplier 
! 
µ
XY
 represents the marginal price associated with the transmission 
constraints on line (X,Y). It is thus the price to transmit one additional unit of electricity from 
node X to node Y, or alternatively, the price of the congestion. 
 
Then, the marginal price of electricity at each node can be inferred from  and 
! 
µ
XY
 by 
using the PTDF-matrix. 
With C taken as the swing node in our experiment, it results in:  
  
! 
ˆ p A = µe + µXY .PTDF(A,X "Y )
X =A ,B ,C
Y =A ,B ,C
X #Y
$  
! 
ˆ p B = µe + µXY .PTDF(B,X "Y )
X =A ,B ,C
Y =A ,B ,C
X #Y
$  
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APPENDIX 2: BIDDING PROCESS AND OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM FOR THE 
TRANSMISSION AUCTION OF THE COORDINATED EXPLICIT AUCTION 
MECHANISM 
For each period, each generator has the opportunity to submit a set of bids to buy 
transmission rights on the three lines of the network. A bid to buy a transmission right is a 
price-quantity ordered pair such that  is a bid to buy of one generator for a 
transmission right from node X to node Y,  the per unit maximum price that generator 
agrees to pay, and  the transmission capacity from node X to node Y that he requests. We 
also assume that .  
 
! 
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We reduce the notation:  
! 
pi
XY
ti
XY
i
" =
X =A ,B ,C
Y =A ,B ,C
X #Y
" piAB tiAB
i
" + piBA tiBA
i
" + piAC tiAC
i
" + piCA tiCA
i
" + piBC tiBC
i
" + piCB tiCB
i
"  
The outcome of the allocation process is , the transmission capacity units allocated 
to the bid to buy , and  the price for the transmission capacity rights. The 
prices for each line are computed from the Lagrangian of the maximization program and the 
PTDF-matrix.  
! 
L(t,µ) = pi
XY
ti
XY
i
" +
X =A ,B ,C
Y =A ,B ,C
X #Y
" µXY (FiXY $ FMAXXY )
i
"
X =A ,B ,C
Y =A ,B ,C
X #Y
"  
with t, the set of allocated transmission capacities 
! 
µ , the set of Lagrange multipliers 
! 
F
XY
, the flow on line (X,Y) 
! 
F
XY
, the maximum capacity of line (X,Y) 
! 
µ
XY
, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the transmission constraints for line XY.  
 
Once the Lagrangian is optimized, we can compute the value of 
! 
µ
XY
. The Lagrangian 
multiplier 
! 
µ
XY
 represents the marginal price associated with the transmission constraints on 
the line (X,Y). It is thus the price to transmit one additional unit of electricity from node X to 
node Y, or alternatively, the price of the congestion. Then, the marginal price of electricity at 
each line can be inferred from 
! 
µ
XY
 by using the PTDF-matrix. 
! 
ˆ p AB = µAB "1/3.µBC +1/3.µAC  
! 
ˆ p AC = µAC "1/3.µAB +1/3.µBC  
! 
ˆ p BC = µBC "1/3.µAC +1/3.µAC  
If the allocation implies no congestion, generators are not charged for the capacity 
allocated.  
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APPENDIX 3: SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS AT EACH NODE 
Individual demand and supply at node A 
Generator 1 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … Cm  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 150 50  0 400 49 
151 200 70  401 500 0 
201 350 150     
351 450 200     
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … Cm  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 30 70  0 20 69 
31 180 150  21 570 49 
181 280 200  571 670 0 
 
Generator 2 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … Cm  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 40 90  0 10 89 
41 140 200  11 60 64 
    61 160 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … Cm  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 20 90  0 30 89 
21 120 200  31 80 69 
    81 180 0 
 
Generator 3 and Generator 4 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 100 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 100 0 
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Individual demand and supply at node B 
Generator 1 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)°  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 30 80  0 70 79 
31 80 130  71 170 0 
81 180 200     
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 30 110  0 40 109 
31 130 200  41 140 79 
    141 240 0 
 
Generator 2 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 80 75  0 20 74 
81 130 110  21 120 49 
131 230 200  121 220 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 110  0 60 109 
101 200 200  61 160 49 
    161 260 0 
 
Generator 3 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 130 85  0 120 84 
131 280 110  121 270 49 
281 380 200  271 370 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 60 105  0 100 104 
61 160 200  101 350 79 
    351 500 49 
    501 600 0 
 
Generator 4 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 100 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 100 0 
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Individual demand and supply at node C 
Generator 1 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 10 110  0 20 109 
11 110 200  21 120 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 50 130 
       51 150 0 
 
Generator 2 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 100 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 100 0 
 
Generator 3 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 10 110  0 50 109 
11 110 200  51 80 69 
       81 180 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 100 200  0 30 130 
    31 60 110 
    61 160 0 
 
Generator 4 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 60 100  0 100 99 
61 160 200  101 270 69 
    271 370 0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC°  Redemption value 
From unit… To unit … MC  From unit… To unit … RV 
0 90 125  0 30 125 
91 190 200  31 130 110 
    131 300 70 
    301 400 0 
 
